Incorporating social practices in BDI agent systems by Cranefield, Stephen & Dignum, Frank
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
03
18
9v
1 
 [c
s.M
A]
  7
 M
ar 
20
19
Incorporating social practices in BDI agent systems
Stephen Cranefield
University of Otago
Dunedin, New Zealand
stephen.cranefield@otago.ac.nz
Frank Dignum
Umeå University
Umeå, Sweden
frank.dignum@umu.se
ABSTRACT
When agents interact with humans, either through embodied agents
or because they are embedded in a robot, it would be easy if they
could use fixed interaction protocols as they do with other agents.
However, people do not keep fixed protocols in their day-to-day
interactions and the environments are often dynamic, making it im-
possible to use fixed protocols. Deliberating about interactions from
fundamentals is not very scalable either, because in that case all pos-
sible reactions of a user have to be considered in the plans. In this
paper we argue that social practices can be used as an inspiration
for designing flexible and scalable interaction mechanisms that are
also robust. However, using social practices requires extending the
traditional BDI deliberation cycle to monitor landmark states and
perform expected actions by leveraging existing plans. We define
and implement this mechanism in Jason using a periodically run
meta-deliberation plan, supported by a metainterpreter, and illus-
trate its use in a realistic scenario.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Imagine the scenario where a disabled person, living alone, is as-
sisted by a care robot. The robot takes care that the person gets up
every morning and makes sure that he drinks some coffee and takes
his morning pills (if needed). Then they read the newspaper, which
means that the person looks at the pictures in the paper and the ro-
bot reads the articles out loud for the person to hear. (The hearing
of the person is better than his eyesight, so, he cannot read the small
font of the newspaper well, but can hear the robot).
When agents in the role of this type of personal assistant or care
robot have to interact with humans over a longer time period and
in a dynamic environment (that is not controlled by the agent), the
interaction management becomes very difficult. When fixed proto-
cols are used for the interaction they are often not appropriate in
all situations and cause breakdowns and consequent loss of trust
in the system. However, to have real-time deliberation about the
best response during the interaction is not very scalable, because in
real life the contexts are dynamic and complex and thus the agent
would need to take many parameters into consideration at each step.
Thus we need something in between a completely scripted interac-
tion that is too brittle and a completely open interaction that is not
scalable.
As we have done before in the agent community, we take inspira-
tion from human interactions and the way they are managed by indi-
viduals. We classify situations into standard contexts in which a cer-
tain social practice can be applied. Social science has studied this
phenomenon in social practice theory. Social practice theory comes
forth from a variety of different sub-disciplines of social science. It
started from philosophical sociology with proponents like Bourdieu
[3] and Giddens [8]. Later on Reckwitz and Shove [16, 18] have ex-
panded on these ideas, and also Schatzki [17] made some valuable
contributions.
These authors all claim that important features of human life
should be understood in terms of organized constellations of inter-
acting persons. Thus people are not just creating these practices, but
our deliberations are also based on the fact that most of our life is
shaped by social practices. Thus we use social practices to catego-
rize situations and decide upon ways of behaviour based on social
practices. The main intuition behind this is that our life is quite
cyclic, in that many activities come back with a certain regularity.
We have meals every day, go to work on Monday until Friday, go to
the supermarket once a week, etc. These so-called Patterns of Life
([7]) can be exploited to create standard situations and expectations.
It makes sense to categorize recurrent situations as social practices
with a kind of standard behaviour for each of them.
Unfortunately social practice theory has not been widely used in
computer science or in HCI and thus there are no ready-to-use tools
in order to incorporate them in agents. It is clear from the above
description that social practices are more than just a protocol or a
frame to be used by the agent in its deliberation. Therefore, in this
paper we make the following contributions. We propose a mecha-
nism for BDI agents to maintain awareness about active social prac-
tices, and to leverage their existing plans to act in accordance with
these practices. This is presented as a meta-deliberation plan that
can be directly executed by Jason agents, or treated as a specifica-
tion for an optimised implementation in an extended agent platform.
This plan has been deployed in the (simulated) care robot scenario,
to confirm that awareness of and adherence to a social practice en-
ables the robot to have a more successful interaction with the patient
over a longer period of time. As some of the features needed to im-
plement this scenario, and to support our meta-deliberation plan,
are not currently available in Jason, we also present a Jason metain-
terpreter, which provides this extended functionality, but can also
be used independently to support other research on extensions to
practical reasoning in the BDI agent paradigm.
In the next section, we give an introduction to the purpose and
structure of social practices. In Section 3, we elaborate on the care
robot scenario and how we have modelled it in Jason. In Section 4,
we describe the role of social practices in this scenario, and discuss
the requirements this imposes for a BDI agent. In Section 5, we
present our mechanism for extending Jason to leverage social prac-
tices, and the metainterpreter needed to support this. We finish the
paper with some conclusions and suggestions for future work.
2 SOCIAL PRACTICES
Social practices are defined as accepted ways of doing things, con-
textual and materially mediated, that are shared between actors and
routinized over time [16]. They can be seen as patterns which can be
filled in by a multitude of single and often unique actions. Through
(joint) performance, the patterns provided by the practice are filled
out and reproduced.
According to [16, 18] a social practice consists of three parts:
• Material: covers all physical aspects of the performance of
a practice, including the human body and objects that are
available (relates to physical aspects of a context).
• Meaning: refers to the issues which are considered to be rele-
vant with respect to that material, i.e. understandings, beliefs
and emotions (relates to social aspects of a situation).
• Competence: refers to skills and knowledge which are re-
quired to perform the practice (relates to the notion of de-
liberation about a situation).
Whereas the first and third parts intuitively can be made more
precise for an implementation, the second part is rather vague. Let
us consider these three parts of a social practice in the scenario of
the care robot scenario introduced in Section 1. The material refers
to the room where the robot serves morning coffee for the disabled
person. It includes the materials that are needed to make coffee
(such as coffee and a coffee maker) and serve it (such as a cup
and tray). However, it also includes the table and other furniture
in the room, the newspaper (if present), the TV, radio, computer,
tablet, and the robot and person (and possible other people that are
present).
The competence part describes what activities every party can
perform and expectations about what they will actually do. For ex-
ample, the robot is capable of making coffee and serving it. The per-
son can drink his coffee by himself. They both can read the newspa-
per or watch TV. The expectation is that the robot wakes the person
if he is not awake yet, makes the coffee and gives it to the person.
After that they will read the newspaper together to provide mental
stimulation. Note, these are expectations, not a protocol. So, parties
can deviate from it and they can also fill the parts in, in ways they
see fit best. The meaning part has to do with all the social interpre-
tations that come with the social practice, e.g. drinking coffee in the
morning might give the person a sense of well-being that he can use
to face the challenges of the rest of the day. When the coffee is cold
or weak the person might interpret it as disinterest on the part of the
robot in his well-being. The goal of reading the newspaper might
also be not just to get the information from it, but a form of enter-
tainment and feeling related to the robot, because you do something
together.
Given the above descriptions of social practices one can summa-
rize the purpose of them for individuals (informally) as follows:
Perceive(resources)⇒ Expect(activities)∧Expect(competencies)
Done(activities) ⇒ physical(postconditions)∧social(postconditions)
Given a certain situation that is perceived in which the social prac-
tice is activated, the social practice now triggers expectations that
the activities of that social practice will be executed. This implies
that we assume a certain competence of all the people involved in
the social practice (e.g. the robot can make coffee). After the activ-
ities have been executed, we do not just assume the postconditions
of the actions hold, but also assume that certain social effects have
been achieved according to the “meaning” of the practice. Thus
the social practice allows us to make a whole set of assumptions
and have expectations that could otherwise not be readily made or
would take a lot of effort to derive.
From the above description it can already be seen that social
practices are more encompassing than conventions and norms. Con-
ventions focus on the strategic advantage that an individual gets by
conforming to the convention. The reason to follow a convention is
that if all parties involved comply, a kind of optimal coordination is
reached, i.e. if we all drive on the left side of the road, traffic will
be smoother than when everyone chooses the side to drive on freely.
Thus, conventions focus on the actual actions being performed and
how they optimize the coordination. Social practices do not neces-
sarily optimize the coordination. Because they indicate expected ac-
tions and interactions given a social and physical context they will
smoothen the coordination. However, this is not necessarily the op-
timal way the coordination could have been done. For example, if
we go to a presentation, we sit down as soon as we see chairs stand-
ing in rows in the room. However, we could also keep standing (as
is often done outside).
Social practices are also different from norms. Norms are also ap-
plicable in certain situations and for particular people (or roles) and
they also create expectations (namely that the norm is followed).
However, norms usually dictate a very specific behaviour rather
than creating a set of loosely couple expectations as is the case
for social practices. E.g. if the norm states that a car has to stop
for a red light, it gives a very specific directive. If a norm is more
abstract (like “drive carefully”) then we need to translate this into
concrete norms for specific situations. This is different from saying
that some parts of a situation are governed by the norm and others
are still free of the normative influence. Basically, when specifying
the norm one indicates exactly when the norm is applicable rather
than general situations for which the norm can be applied in some
part.
One framework that seems very close to social practices is the
notion of scripts. However, social practices are not just mere scripts
in the sense of Minsky [14]. Practices are more flexible than the
classical frames defined by scripts in that they can be extended and
changed by learning, and the “slots” only need to be filled in as
far as they are needed to determine a course of action. Using these
structures changes planning in many common situations to pattern
recognition and filling in parameters. They support, rather than re-
strict, deliberation about behaviour. For example, the social practice
of “going to work” incorporates usual means of transport that can
be used, timing constraints, weather and traffic conditions, etc. So,
normally you take a car to work, but if the weather is exceptionally
bad, the social practice does not force the default action, but rather
gives input for deliberation about a new plan in this situation, such
as taking a bus or train (or even staying home). So, social practices
can be seen as a kind of flexible script. Moreover, scripts do not
incorporate any social meaning for the activities performed in them
as social practices do.
Social practices have been used in applications already in a vari-
ety of ways. In [12, 15] they have been used as part of social simu-
lations. In those applications, social practices are used as a standard
package of actions with a special status. Thus individuals can use
them with a certain probability given the circumstances are right.
However, these applications do not use the internal structure of so-
cial practices for the planning of the individuals. Social practices
have been used for applications in natural language and dialogue
management in [1, 9]. Here, the social practices are used to guide
the planning process, but are geared towards a particular dialogue
rather than as part of a more general interaction. In [13] it is shown
how social practices can be used by a traditional epistemic multi-
agent planner to provide efficient and robust plans in cooperative
settings. However, in this case the planner was not part of a BDI
agent with its own goals and plans, but completely dedicated to
finding a plan for the situation at hand. In [6] a first structure of
social practices was presented that is more amenable for the use by
agents. The paper is, unfortunately, only conceptual and no imple-
mentation was made yet. In this paper we will follow the structure
described in [6], but use only those parts that are relevant for our
scenario. A complete account would be far too large to fit in the
space available here, but we take those parts that seem to be core
to the idea of social practices and show how they work with BDI
agents in the Jason platform.
The complete structure for social practices (based on [6]) is as
follows:
Context
• Roles describe the competencies and expectations about a
certain type of actor. Thus the robot is expected to be able to
make a cup of coffee.
• Actors are all people and autonomous systems involved, that
have capability to reason and (inter)act. This indicates the
agents that are expected to fulfil a part in the practice. In our
scenario, these are the robot and the person.
• Resources are objects that are used by the actions in the prac-
tice, such as cups, coffee, trays, curtains, and chairs. So, they
are assumed to be available both for standard actions and for
the planning within the practice.
• Affordances are the properties of the context that permit so-
cial actions and depend on the match between context con-
ditions and actor characteristics. For example, the bed might
be used as a chair, or a mug as a cup.
• Places indicates where all objects and actors are usually lo-
cated relatively to each other, in space or time: the cups are
in the cupboard in the kitchen, the person is in the chair (or
in bed), etc.
Meaning
• Purpose determines the social interpretation of actions and
of certain physical situations. For example, the purpose of
reading the newspaper is to get information about current
affairs and to entertain the person.
• Promotes indicates the values that are promoted (or demoted,
by promoting the opposite) by the social practice. Giving cof-
fee to the person will promote the value of “caring”.
• Counts-as are rules of the type “X counts as Y in C” link-
ing brute facts (X) and institutional facts (Y) in the context
(C). E.g., reading the newspaper with the person counts as
entertaining the person.
Expectations
• Plan patterns describe usual patterns of actions defined by
the landmarks that are expected to occur (states of affairs
around which the inter-agent coordination is structured). For
example, the care robot first checks if the person is awake
then makes sure there is coffee served.
• Norms describe the rules of (expected) behaviour within the
practice. E.g., the robot should ask the person if he wants
coffee, before starting to make it.
• Strategies indicate condition-action pairs that can occur at
any time during the practice. E.g. if the person drops the cof-
fee, the robot will clean it up. If the robot notices the person
is asleep (again) it will try to wake him.
• A Start condition, or trigger, indicates how the social prac-
tice starts, e.g., The practice of having morning coffee starts
at 8 am.
• A Duration, or End condition, indicates how the social prac-
tice ends, e.g., the morning routine takes around 45 minutes
and ends when the newspaper is read and the coffee is fin-
ished.
Activities
• Possible actions describes the expected actions by actors in
the social practice, e.g. making coffee, reading the newspa-
per, and opening curtains.
• Requirements indicate the type of capabilities or competences
that the agent is expected to have in order to perform the
activities within this practice. For example, the robot is ex-
pected to know how to make coffee and read the newspaper.
In [5] there is a first formalization of all these aspects based on dy-
namic logic. Due to space limitations we will not include this whole
formalization here, but just discuss a few points that are important
for the current implementation of social practices in Jason.
The core element of the social practice for an agent is the plan pat-
tern, which gives it handles to plan its behaviour. Plan patterns are
defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. Plan Patterns Language
A Plan Pattern of a social practice is an element of the set PP, which
is the smallest set closed under
γϕ ∈ PP
γ1ϕ1,γ2ϕ2 ∈ PP ⇒ γ1ϕ1 + γ2ϕ2 ∈ PP
γ1ϕ1,γ2ϕ2 ∈ PP ⇒ γ1ϕ1&γ2ϕ2 ∈ PP
γ1ϕ1,γ2ϕ2 ∈ PP ⇒ γ1ϕ1;γ2ϕ2 ∈ PP
Here γϕ stands for any sequence of actions γ that contain actions
contributing towards the achievement of ϕ (starting from a particu-
lar situation). ϕ is the purpose of that part of the practice. There can
be more effects, but they are not all specified. So, in our morning
routine practice the plan pattern can be defined as:
γ1ϕ1; (γ2ϕ2&γ3ϕ3);γ4ϕ4
ϕ1 is the person is awake
ϕ2 is the coffee is served and ϕ3 is the pills are taken
ϕ4 is the person is mentally stimulated.
So, the purpose of the first part of the morning routine is that the per-
son is awake. This might be done by opening the curtains, giving
some loud noise or otherwise. If the purpose is achieved by opening
the curtains, not only is the person awake, but the curtains are also
open. The latter is merely a side effect of achieving the purpose in
this way.
Two more things should be noted about these patterns. One is
that the overall pattern is supposed to achieve the overall purpose of
the social practice. This is a formal constraint, but we only treat this
implicitly. The other is that after a part of the plan pattern is finished,
it automatically triggers the start of the next part of the pattern. In
the full formalism this is assured, but is not explicit from only this
fragment. In the same way, a social practice is started when the start
condition becomes true. It then becomes available for execution and
can be used by any agent present in the situation.
Finally, the formalism of social practices also guarantees that
there is a common belief in the elements of the social practice and
if actions are taken everyone has the at least a common belief about
the effects in as far as they are important for the social practice.
Thus it guarantees a common situation awareness.
3 THE CARE ROBOT SCENARIO
In this section we elaborate on the care robot scenario outlined in
the introduction, and describe how we have modelled and imple-
mented it using Jason.
We assume the high-level operation of the robot is based on a
BDI interpreter, and that it comes equipped with goals and plans
to trigger and enact its care activities (most likely with some cus-
tomisation of key parameters possible). In this section we consider
only a small subset of the robot’s duties: to wake the patient at a
certain time in the morning, to provide coffee as required, and to
provide mental stimulation. We do not specify any goals of the ro-
bot outside the practice here, but normally the care robot would also
have its own goals such as powering its battery, (vacuum) cleaning
a room and taking care of the health of the patient. The morning
routine can be seen as a part of the plan to take care of the health
of the patient, while there might be no social practice for vacuum
cleaning and this is completely handled by the standard BDI part of
the care robot.
Social practices provide patterns of coordination for multiple
agents in terms of landmark states rather than explicit sequences
of actions. Therefore they do not make limiting assumptions about
the temporal aspects of actions and their effects leading up to a
landmark. Only the landmarks themselves are explicitly temporally
ordered. To illustrate this we include some temporal complexity in
the scenario by including durative actions (i.e. those that take place
across an interval of time), an action with a delayed effect, and a
joint durative action, which has its desired effect only if two par-
ticipants perform it during overlapping time intervals. Durative and
joint actions are implemented using a Jason metainterpreter1 that is
described in Section 5. To simulate the passing of time, we use a
“ticker” agent with a recursive plan that periodically performs a tick
action to update the time recorded in the environment. We use Ja-
son’s synchronous execution mode, so the robot, patient and ticker
agents perform a single reasoning step in every step of the simula-
tion.
Figure 1 shows the robot’s initial beliefs, rules and plans. It has
four sets of plans (lines 25 onwards). These have declarative goals
(i.e. their triggering goals express desired states) and use Jason pre-
processing directives to transform them according to a predefined
declarative achievement goal pattern [2].
1A metainterpreter is a programming language interpreter written in the same, or a
similar, language. It can be used to prototype extensions to the base language.
1 // Initial beliefs and rules
2
3 durative(makePodCoffee).
4 durative(readNewspaper).
5 joint(readNewspaper).
6 durative_action_continuation_pred
7 (readNewspaper, continueReadingNewspaper).
8 durative_action_continuation_pred(makePodCoffee,
9 continueMakingPodCoffee).
10 continueReadingNewspaper :-
11 started(readNewspaper, T1) &
12 not started_durative_action(readNewspaper, patient, _) &
13 time(T2) &
14 T2 <= T1 + 20.
15 continueReadingNewspaper :-
16 started_durative_action(readNewspaper, patient, _) &
17 not stopped_durative_action(readNewspaper, patient, _).
18
19 continueMakingPodCoffee :- state(coffee, not_made).
20
21 wake_up_phrase("Good morning sleepyhead!").
22
23 // Plans
24
25 {begin ebdg(state(patient,awake))}
26 +!state(patient,awake) : wake_up_phrase(P) <- talkToPatient(P).
27 +!state(patient,awake) <- shakePatient.
28 +!state(patient,awake) <-
29 openCurtains;
30 .wait(state(patient, awake), 30000).
31 {end}
32
33 {begin ebdg(state(patient,mentally_stimulated))}
34 +!state(patient, mentally_stimulated) <-
35 .wait(state(patient, awake)); .fail.
36 +!state(patient, mentally_stimulated) <- play_mozart.
37 +!state(patient, mentally_stimulated) <-
38 !solve([body_term(
39 "", readNewspaper[participants([patient,robot])])]).
40 {end}
41
42 +!state(coffee, served) <-
43 !state(coffee, made);
44 serveCoffee.
45
46 {begin ebdg(state(coffee,made))}
47 +!state(coffee, made) :
48 resource(coffee_pods) & resource(coffee_pod_machine) <-
49 makePodCoffee;
50 .wait(state(coffee, made), 10000).
51 +!state(coffee, made) : resource(instant_coffee) <-
52 makeInstantCoffee.
53 {end}
54
55 { include("metainterpreter.asl") }
Figure 1: Plans for the care robot domain
The first set of plans (lines 25–31) are for achieving a state where
the patient is awake, with alternative plans for talking to the patient,
shaking him, and opening the curtains and waiting for the light to
wake him. The exclusive backtracking declarative goal (“edbg”)
pattern specifies that additional failure-handling logic should be
added to ensure that all the plans will be tried (once each) until the
goal is achieved, or all plans fail. The action of opening the curtains
has a delayed effect: it will eventually wake the patient2.
The second set of plans (lines 33–40) are used for the goal of
having the patient mentally simulated, and also use the ebdg pattern.
The first plan waits for the patient to be awake, and then fails so
that the other plans will be tried. The other two alternatives involve
playing the music of Mozart to the patient, and initiating the joint
action of reading the newspaper with the patient. As joint actions
are not directly supported by Jason, lines 38–39 call this action via
the solve goal that is handled by our metainterpreter.
2Actions are implemented in Jason by defining an execute method in Java class mod-
elling the environment. The delay is currently hard-coded in this class.
These plans are followed by a single plan for serving coffee. This
has the subgoal of having the coffee made, and then the action of
serving the coffee is performed.
The final set of plans are for reaching a state in which the coffee
is made. The options are to use a coffee pod and wait for it to finish
(up to a time limit)3, or to make instant coffee.
The initial segment of the listing contains initial beliefs and rules
related to the processing of durative actions: declarations of which
actions are declarative and/or joint, and predicates and associated
rules defining the circumstances in which the robot will continue
performing the durative actions.
The environment sends a percept to all participants of a joint ac-
tion when any other participant performs the action for the first time
or performs a stop action with the joint action as an argument. The
patient agent has a plan to take his pills once he is awake. He also
has a plan that will respond to the robot beginning the joint newspa-
per reading action by also beginning that action. He will continue
reading the newspaper for 40 time units if he is in a good mood,
but only 20 if it is in a bad mood. Being woken by daylight (after
the curtains are opened) leaves him in a good mood; being shaken
awake leaves him in a bad mood, and talking will not wake him up.
Thus, if the robot begins with goals to have the patient awake and
mentally stimulated, the patient will be left in a bad mood by being
shaken awake and the newspaper reading will be shorter (and less
stimulating) that if he were in a good mood.
4 A CARE ROBOT WITH SOCIAL
PRACTICES
Section 3 introduced the care robot scenario. In this section, we
consider how the robot could be enhanced using social practices.
As noted previously, it is assumed that the robot comes equipped
with appropriate goals and plans, and that it is possible to customise
certain parameters such as the time the user likes to wake up, and
the time and style of coffee that he likes to have. However, customis-
ing each plan in isolation will not easily provide the coordination
between activities and dynamic adaptability to different contexts
that can be provided by social practices. To perform most effec-
tively, the robot should choose, for a given context, the plans for
each goal that will achieve the best outcomes for the patient, and
furthermore, consider constraints on goal orderings that arise from
preferences and habit. For example, if the patient prefers to be wo-
ken at a certain time in a given context (e.g. when his family is due
to visit) and/or in a certain way (e.g. by the curtains being opened),
his mood is likely to be adversely affected if he is woken at a dif-
ferent time, and his engagement with subsequent activities (such as
reading the newspaper together) may be reduced. In this section we
describe how this type of contextual information can be addressed
by the use of a social practice.
In Section 3, we described the various plans and actions available
to the robot. We now assume that the following “morning routine”
social practice has emerged4. We present this as a set of beliefs in
the form used by our social practice reasoning plans that will be
discussed in Section 5. Note that we only illustrate a small subset
3The wait timeouts (in ms) in these plans are for simulation purposes only, and would
be much longer in a real-world application.
4It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider how social practices might be learned
and/or communicated.
of what would be likely to be a real morning routine for a patient
and his/her care robot, but this is sufficient to highlight the nature
of social practices and their relation to BDI agents.
social_practice(morningRoutine,
[state(location, home), resource(coffee_pods),
resource(coffee_pod_machine), resource(pills),
resource(newspaper_subscription),
(time(T) & T < 1200)]).
landmark(morningRoutine, pa,
[], [action(robot, openCurtains)],
state(patient, awake)).
landmark(morningRoutine, pt,
[pa], [action(patient, takePills)],
state(pills, taken)).
landmark(morningRoutine, cs,
[pa], [action(robot, makePodCoffee)],
state(coffee, served)).
landmark(morningRoutine, ms,
[pt,cs], [action([robot,patient], readNewspaper)],
state(patient, mentally_stimulated)).
The first belief above encodes the name of the social practice and
a list of conditions that must all hold for it to become active: there
are constraints on the location, the resources available, and the time
(here, the number 1200 is a proxy for some real-world time that
ends the morning routine period).
The other four beliefs model the landmarks, specifying the social
practice they are part of, an identifier for the landmark, a list of
landmarks that must have been reached previously, a list of actions
and their actors that are associated with the landmark, and finally,
a goal that is the purpose of the landmark. The landmarks are: (1)
to have the patient awake due to the robot opening the curtains, (2)
for the patient to have taken his pills, (3) to have the coffee served,
which should involve the robot making pod coffee, and (4) for the
patient to be mentally stimulated due to the newspaper being read
jointly. These landmarks are partially ordered with 1 before 2 and
3, which both precede 4.
Comparing this social practice to the robot plans shown in Fig-
ure 1, it can be seen that it avoids an ineffective attempt to wake
the patient by talking to him, and prevents him from being left in a
bad mood after being shaken awake. It agrees with the first-ordered
plan for making coffee (by making pod coffee), and avoids an ill-
fated attempt by the robot to provide mental stimulation by playing
Mozart. Furthermore, it specifies an ordering on these activities that
is not intrinsic to the plans themselves. Note also, that the social
practice does not provide complete information on how to reach the
landmark of having coffee served: it indicates that the robot should
make pod coffee, but doesn’t specify the action of serving the cof-
fee. While a planning system could deduce the missing action using
a model of actions and their effects [13], a BDI agent does not have
this capability. Instead, a BDI agent using social practices must rea-
son about how its existing plans could be used to satisfy landmarks
given potentially incomplete information about the actions it must
perform.
Furthermore, the robot may already have goals to wake the pa-
tient, provide mental stimulation, etc., and the activation of a social
practice should not create additional instances of those goals. Thus,
the activation of a social practice should override the agent’s normal
behaviour (for the relevant goals) during the period of activation.
As social practices are structured in terms of ordered landmarks,
which model expected states to be reached in a pattern of inter-agent
coordination, it is necessary for the agent to actively monitor the
status of landmarks once their prior landmarks have been achieved,
and to actively work towards the fulfilment of the current landmarks
for which it has associated actions. In the next section, we present
a meta-deliberation cycle for Jason agents that addresses this and
the other issues outlined above, and which enables the successful
execution of our care robot enhanced with social practices.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 Meta-level reasoning about social practices
Maintaining awareness of social practices (SPs), and contribut-
ing to them in an appropriate way, requires agents to detect when
each known social practice becomes active or inactive, to monitor
the state of the landmarks in an active social practice, and to trigger
the appropriate activity if an active SP has an action for the agent as-
sociated with the next landmark. This is a type of meta-level reason-
ing that the agent should perform periodically, and it may override
the performance of any standard BDI processing of goals, which is
not informed by social practices. We note that, on an abstract level,
the same was done in [1] where the plan pattern was translated into
a global pattern in Drools (Java based expert system) and the spe-
cific interactions within each phase were programmed in a chatbot.
The question then arises of how best to implement such a meta-
level reasoner in a BDI architecture. While the best performance
can, no doubt, be achieved by extending a BDI platform using its
underlying implementation language, this approach requires signif-
icant knowledge of the implementation and requires using an imper-
ative coding style that is not best suited to reasoning about goals [10]
and for rapid prototyping and dissemination of new reasoning tech-
niques. Therefore, in this work we define the meta-level reasoner
as a plan for a metadeliberate goal that reasons about social
practices, sleeps and then calls itself recursively. This, and some
other plans it triggers, are shown in Figure 2. The plans make use
of some extensions to Jason, handled by a metainterpreter that is
described in the following subsection5 .
First, we give a brief overview of the syntax of the AgentSpeak
syntax, as implemented (and extended) in Jason. Based on logic-
programming languages like Prolog, the basic language constructs
are atoms (beginning with lower case letters), variables (beginning
with upper case letters), and structured terms with a functor and
terms as arguments. Jason also allows terms to have annotations:
lists of terms in square brackets, and these are treated specially
during unification6. Agent programs consist of initial beliefs, rules
(Horn clauses) and plans. Plans are expressed using the syntax @Label
Trigger : ContextCond <- PlanBody, where Label, ContextCond
and PlanBody are optional. Triggers are events such as the creation
of a new goal (+!GoalTerm) or a new belief (+BeliefTerm). Con-
textCond is a logical formula stating when the plan is applicable,
and is evaluated using beliefs and rules. A plan body contains a se-
quence of actions (terms with no prefix), built-in internal actions
(terms whose functor contains a “.”), belief additions and deletions
(with prefix ‘+’ and ‘-’, respectively), queries over beliefs and rules
5See https://github.com/scranefield/jason-social-practices for source code.
6https://github.com/jason-lang/jason/blob/master/doc/tech/annotations.adoc
(with prefix ‘?’), and subgoals (with prefix ‘!’ or ‘!!’—the latter cre-
ates a separate intention for the subgoal). Some control structures
such as if-then-else are also supported within a plan body.
The social practice reasoner runs in response to the goal meta-
Deliberate (line 10 in Figure 2). Lines 13 to 31 show the plan
for this goal. The atomic annotation on the plan label ensures that
steps of this plan are not interleaved with steps of other plans. The
plan begins by (re)considering which social practice (if any) should
be active. It uses the rules in lines 3 to 7 to find social practices
that are relevant (i.e. all their requirements hold), and to select one
(currently, the first option is always selected). If none are relevant
(lines 17–20), any existing belief about the currently selected social
practice is retracted. Otherwise (lines 22–28), if the selection has
changed, the belief about the selection is updated. Any monitored
landmarks are then checked to see if their purpose has been fulfilled
(lines 26–28). If so, a belief about their completion is added. The
plan then sleeps for period, before triggering itself to be re-run in
a new intention (lines 30–31). The new intention is needed for the
recursive call as the plan is atomic, and the agent’s other plans must
be allowed to run).
A new belief about a selected social practice is handled by the
plan in lines 33–46. This loops through the landmarks to check if
the agent already has intentions to achieve any of their purposes7 . If
so, these intentions are suspended, and this is recorded in a belief so
the intentions can be later marked as successful if the landmark is
completed (see line 73). A plan is also temporarily added (lines 40-
42) to ensure that if some other active plan of the agent separately
creates this intention, it will be immediately suspended (the new
plan is placed before any existing plans for that goal). For each
landmark in the social practice that has no prior landmarks, a goal
is created to activate it (lines 44–46).
Landmark activations are handled by the plan in lines 48–69. A
belief recording that the landmark’s purpose should be monitored
is added, then the action associated with the landmark is processed
(only a single action is supported currently). If the action is to be
performed by the agent, three options are considered. First (line 54),
a query is made to find a solution for achieving the landmark’s pur-
pose that involves performing the specified action. A set of rules
(not shown) handle this query by searching for the action recur-
sively (up to a prespecified depth bound) through the plans that
achieve the purpose, and the subgoals in those plans, and so on.
The plans’ context conditions are checked for the top level plans
(those for the landmark’s purpose), but the recursive calls do not,
as, in general, it cannot be known how the state of the world will
change as these plans are executed. If such a solution is found, it is
recorded as a goal-plan tree “path” (see Section 5.2) and passed to
a call to our Jason metainterpreter (line 56). If no such solution is
found, and the action is a joint, durative or internal one, the metain-
terpreter is called to handle this (lines 58–65. Otherwise, the action
is performed directly (line 67).
Finally, the plan in lines 71–87 handles completed landmarks—
those for which the purpose has been achieved. Any suspended in-
tentions for the purpose are succeeded, the belief stating that the
landmark should be monitored is retracted, and the temporary plan
7The unifications in lines 35 and 50 instantiate the variable on the left with the value
of the variable on the right, but with any annotations removed.
added in lines 40-42 is removed. The plan then checks for subse-
quent landmarks that should now be activated (if all their prior land-
marks are completed), and finally adds a belief that the social prac-
tice has completed if all its landmarks are completed. Another plan
(not shown) handles social practices that become inactive when
their relevance conditions cease to hold. In this case, any active land-
marks should be abandoned, and original intentions to achieve their
purposes can be resumed.
With these plans and the metadeliberation goal in place, our ro-
bot and patient agent can successfully coordinate their actions across
the landmarks of the social practice, ensuring that the patient re-
mains in a good mood, and engages in the newspaper reading for
longer.
5.2 A Jason metainterpreter
Figure 3 shows our Jason metainterpreter, which extends the
AgentSpeak metainterpreter defined byWinikoff [19], and specialises
it for use with Jason. The metainterpreter is initiated by calling a
solve goal with a list of plan body terms, i.e. terms represent-
ing the various types of goals and actions that can appear in a plan
body. In each plan_body term, the Prefix argument identifies
the type of the goal or action by a string (e.g. ‘?’ for a query to the
belief base, ‘+’ for a belief addition, and ‘!’ for a subgoal). From
line 16 onwards, each solve trigger event has additional argu-
ments that: (a) identify the current intention as a stack of current
subgoal indices within each active plan body, interleaved with the
labels for the plans currently active to solve those subgoals, and
(b) a final Path argument, explained below. The intention identi-
fier is used in lines 64 to 71, which sequentially try the plans for
a goal, asserting beliefs about the plans that have been tried. Lines
70 and 71 leverage Jason’s failure-handling mechanisms (posting
achievement goal deletion events upon goal failure) to detect that
an attempt to “solve” a plan failed, and to try the next plan. Finally,
note that there are two work-arounds for current restrictions of Ja-
son. First, as Jason does not provide a way to decompose a plan
body from within plans, line 30 calls a custom internal action we
have implemented in Java. Given a trigger event (e.g. a new goal
event), this action returns a list of relevant plans, encoded as list
of plan terms, each including a list of plan_body terms. Second,
internal (in-built) actions cannot be called dynamically via instanti-
ated higher order variables (as used for other actions: see line 56).
Therefore, lines 57 to 60 enumerate specific internal actions that are
supported (and more can be added).
We made the following extensions to support new capabilities;
(1) Durative actions, as required by our scenario, are supported
(lines 38–55 and 73–86)8 . A continuation predicate, and op-
tionally a clean-up goal9, for the action are looked up (lines
40–45), the time the action was started is recorded as a belief
(line 53), and a solve_durative goal is created (line 55)
to trigger the performance of the action. The plan for this
goal (lines 73–84) checks the continuation condition (passed
as variable Query). It is intended that the query is a 0-arity
predicate defined by a rule in the agent’s program. If the
8The first context condition on line 39 instantiates variable Act to the action term, with
any Jason annotations removed.
9Cleanup goals can be used to remove any temporary state recorded as beliefs during
a durative action’s execution, but are not important for the discussion in this paper.
query succeeds, the action is executed with a “durative” an-
notation (which the environment should check for), and pos-
sibly an annotation listing the action participants if it is a
joint action (see below). The goal is then called recursively.
If the query fails, stop(Act) is executed (again, with the
appropriate annotations). Thus, durative actions are imple-
mented by repeated execution of an action until the corre-
sponding stop action is called.
(2) Joint actions are also supported. These are durative actions
with an annotation listing the intended action participants.
The environment should notify all intended participants (via
a percept) when a durative action is called for the first time or
is stopped, thus enabling the participants to coordinate their
actions. It should also keep a history of the time intervals
over which the participants perform the action, as its out-
come will depend on the existence and length of a period
of overlap.
(3) As explained in Section 5.1, when a landmark in a social
practice includes an action associated with the current agent,
the plan to activate a landmark attempts to find an existing
plan that can achieve the landmark’s purpose while also in-
cluding the specified action. This is a recursive search through
plans and their subgoals, and it results in a pre-selected path
through the goal-plan tree [11] corresponding to the search
space for satisfying the landmark’s purpose. This path can be
passed to the metainterpreter (line 12), to guide it directly to
the pre-chosen subplans, and eventually the desired action.
This feature is useful for plan pre-selection in other meta-
reasoning contexts as well, e.g. choosing plans based on their
effect on the values of a human user [4].
6 CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that for interactive settings, as sketched in our sce-
nario, the use of social practices is a good compromise between us-
ing a fixed interaction protocol and deliberation and planning from
scratch at each point during the interaction. We proposed a mech-
anism for a BDI agent to maintain awareness about and contribute
towards the completion of social practices, and presented this as a
meta-deliberation plan for Jason agents. To extend Jason with fea-
tures required for this plan and our care robot scenario, we also pre-
sented a Jason metainterpreter. These contributions can serve as a
specification of potential extensions to the BDI reasoning cycle, but
also allow the approach to be directly applied within Jason agents.
Our approach allows BDI agents to use their existing plans to
achieve social practice landmarks that do not detail all actions re-
quired to achieve the landmark. However, there are some subtleties
that remain to be explored. For example, suppose that an agent has
a plan for a goal that is the purpose of a landmark, but that one of
that plan’s subgoals is the purpose of a prior landmark. In that case,
the execution of the plan should be adapted to exclude this subgoal.
In future work we intend to investigate more complex cases such
as this. We also intend to develop elaborate scenarios that use all
aspects of a social practice, and compare these with agent imple-
mentations where no social practice is used, both in terms of the
outcomes of the agent and the ease of design of the agents.
1 /* Rules */
2 // Omitted: has_plan_generating_action/4 and for_all/1
3 relevant_sp(SP) :-
4 social_practice(SP, Requirements) & forall(Requirements).
5 sp_selection(Options, CurrentSP) :-
6 selected_sp(CurrentSP) & .member(CurrentSP, Options).
7 sp_selection([SP|_], SP).
8
9 /* Initial goal */
10 !metaDeliberate.
11
12 /* Plans */
13 @metaplan[atomic]
14 +!metaDeliberate <-
15 .findall(SP, ( relevant_sp(SP) & not completed_sp(SP) ),
16 RelevantSPs);
17 if (RelevantSPs == []) {
18 if (selected_sp(CurrentlySelectedSP)) {
19 -selected_sp(CurrentlySelectedSP)
20 }
21 } else {
22 if ( sp_selection(RelevantSPs, SelectedSP) &
23 not selected_sp(SelectedSP) ) {
24 -+selected_sp(SelectedSP)
25 }
26 for (monitored(Purpose, SP, ID)) {
27 if (Purpose) { +completed_landmark(SP, ID, Purpose) }
28 }
29 }
30 .wait(500);
31 !!metaDeliberate.
32
33 +selected_sp(SP) <-
34 for (landmark(SP, ID, _, _, Purpose)) {
35 PurposeNoAnnots[dummy] = Purpose[dummy];
36 if (.intend(PurposeNoAnnots)) {
37 .suspend(PurposeNoAnnots);
38 +suspended_intention(SP, ID, PurposeNoAnnots)
39 }
40 .add_plan({@suspend_purpose(SP,ID)
41 +!PurposeNoAnnots <- .suspend(PurposeNoAnnots)},
42 landmark(SP,ID), begin)
43 }
44 for (landmark(SP, ID, [], Actions, Purpose)) {
45 !activate_landmark(SP, ID, Actions, Purpose)
46 }.
47
48 @activate_landmark[atomic]
49 +!activate_landmark(SP, ID, Actions, Purpose) <-
50 PurposeNoAnnots[dummy] = Purpose[dummy];
51 +monitored(PurposeNoAnnots, SP, ID)
52 if (Actions = [action(Actors, Act)] &
53 (Actors = Me | (.list(Actors) & .member(Me, Actors)))) {
54 if (has_plan_generating_action(
55 {+!Purpose}, Act, BodyTerms, Path)) {
56 !!solve([body_term("!",Purpose)], Path)
57 } else {
58 if (joint(Act)) {
59 !!solve([body_term("", Act[participants(Actors)])])
60 } else {
61 if (durative(Act)) {
62 !!solve([body_term("", Act)])
63 } else {
64 if (Act =.. [F, _, _] & .substring(".", F)) {
65 !!solve([body_term(".", Act)])
66 } else {
67 Act
68 }}}}
69 } else { .print("Multiple actions are not yet supported"); }.
70
71 @completed_landmark[atomic]
72 +completed_landmark(SP, ID, Purpose) <-
73 .succeed_goal(Purpose);
74 -monitored(Purpose, SP, ID);
75 .remove_plan(suspend_purpose(SP,ID));
76 for ( landmark(SP, ID2, PrecedingLMs, Actions, Purpose2) &
77 not completed_landmark(SP, ID2, _) &
78 .findall(PrecID, (.member(PrecID, PrecedingLMs) &
79 completed_landmark(SP, PrecID, _)),
80 CompletedPrecIDs) &
81 .difference(PrecedingLMs, CompletedPrecIDs, []) ) {
82 !activate_landmark(SP, ID2, Actions, Purpose2)
83 }
84 .findall(ID2, ( landmark(SP, ID2, _, _,_) &
85 not completed_landmark(SP, ID2, _) ),
86 PendingLandmarks);
87 if (PendingLandmarks == []) { +completed_sp(SP) }.
Figure 2: Rules and plans for social practice reasoning
1 /* Rules */
2 context_ok(plan(_,_,ContextCond,_)) :- ContextCond.
3
4 // Rules for filter_list/3 omitted
5
6 /* Plans */
7
8 // Entry points: solve body term list, with or without a
9 // prespecified path through the goal-plan tree
10
11 +!solve(PlanBodyTerms) <- !solve(PlanBodyTerms, [], 1, no_path).
12 +!solve(PlanBodyTerms, Path) <- !solve(PlanBodyTerms, [], 1, Path).
13
14 // solve body term list
15
16 +!solve([], _, _, _).
17 +!solve([body_term(Prefix, Term)|BTs], Intn, N, Path) <-
18 Intn2 = [N|Intn];
19 !solve(Prefix, Term, Intn2, Path);
20 !solve(BTs, Intn, N+1, Path).
21
22 // solve body terms
23
24 +!solve("?", B, _, _) <- ?B.
25 +!solve("+", B, _, _) <- +B.
26 +!solve("-", B, _, _) <- -B.
27 +!solve("!", solve(PBTs), Intn, Path) <-
28 !solve(PBTs, Intn, 1, Path).
29 +!solve("!", G, Intn, Path) <-
30 meta.relevant_plan_bodies_as_terms({+!G}, RPlans);
31 if (.list(Path) & Path = [N|PathTail] &
32 .nth(N, RPlans, plan(Label,_,_,PlanBodyTerms))) {
33 !solve(PlanBodyTerms, [Label|Intn], 1, PathTail);
34 } else {
35 ?filter_list(RPlans, context_ok, APlans);
36 !solve_one(APlans, Intn, Path);
37 }.
38 +!solve("", AnnotatedAction, _, _) :
39 Act[dummy] = AnnotatedAction[dummy] & durative(Act) <-
40 ?durative_action_continuation_pred(Act, Query);
41 if (durative_action_cleanup_goal(Act, CleanupGoal)) {
42 CUGoal = CleanupGoal;
43 } else {
44 CUGoal = true;
45 }
46 if (joint(Act) & Act[participants(P)] = AnnotatedAction) {
47 ParticipantAnnotation = [participants(P)];
48 } else {
49 ParticipantAnnotation = [];
50 }
51 if (time(T)) {
52 Act[durative|ParticipantAnnotation];
53 -+started(Act, T)[source(meta)];
54 }
55 !solve_durative(Query, Act, ParticipantAnnotation, CUGoal).
56 +!solve("", Action, _, _) <- Action.
57 +!solve(".", .fail, _, _) <- .fail.
58 +!solve(".", .print(S), _, _) <- .print(S).
59 +!solve(".", .wait(Cond), _, _) <- .wait(Cond).
60 +!solve(".", .wait(Cond, Timeout), _, _) <- .wait(Cond, Timeout).
61
62 // Solve some plan in a list of plans
63
64 +!solve_one([plan(Label,_,_,PlanBodyTerms)|_], Intn, Path)
65 : not tried_plan(Label, Intn) <-
66 +tried_plan(Label, Intn);
67 !solve(PlanBodyTerms, [Label|Intn], 1, Path);
68 -tried_plan(Label, Intn).
69
70 -!solve_one([_|PlanTerms], Intn, Path) <-
71 !solve_one(PlanTerms, Intn, Path).
72
73 +!solve_durative(Query, Act,
74 ParticipantAnnotation, CleanupGoal) <-
75 if (Query) {
76 Act[durative|ParticipantAnnotation];
77 !solve_durative(Query, Act,
78 ParticipantAnnotation, CleanupGoal);
79 } else {
80 stop(Act)[durative|ParticipantAnnotation];
81 if (CleanupGoal \== true) {
82 !CleanupGoal;
83 }
84 }.
85 -!solve_durative(_, Act, _) <-
86 -started(Act, _).
Figure 3: A Jason metainterpreter
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